The establishment of moral relativism does not exhaust anthropological comparisons of how people strive for a good life. In this article I suggest that comparative research into ethical systems and moralities can be productively complemented by an anthropology of virtue. Experiences from post-Cold War settings and ethnographic examples from Australia and Namibia illustrate my attempt to outline such an anthropological theory of virtue based on recent anthropological work on art and on skill. The anthropological approach to virtue envisaged here is both nonconsequentialist and realist in orientation. It is non-consequentialist in that it accounts for the moral dimension of practices such as 'sharing' and 'reciprocal exchange' without relying on problematic presumptions about net results or ultimate consequences. It is realist in so far as it is based not on rationalist categories but on situated social practices, which entail reference to basic human goods such as sustenance and mutual engagement.
'customs' phrased in terms of cultural traits and social institutions. 'Morals' have largely disappeared into the larger category of 'ideology' or 'ontology'. 1 Moral notions, positive or negative, that 'ordinary people' recognize when they see them have been replaced with 'fancy talk of "rational choice" or "corporate welfare" ' (Robertson, 2001: 7-8) . Robertson has pointed out that translating primitive notions such as 'greed ' -or, I would add that of 'sharing' -into more detached notions such as 'self-interest' (or 'social welfare') is itself a moral deed. The self-detachment of the researcher is increasingly problematic, not only because it seems non-commonsensical but also because it imposes a separation of mind and body that requires considerable effort to undo.
When anthropologists today explicitly discuss moral questions, for instance questions of access, these questions concern matters of ethical professional conduct, especially in the field in dealings with 'informants' and information. Matters of professional ethics take over considerable space in debates within the discipline and beyond (see the recent debate on anthropological work among the Yanomami [Fisher, 2001; Nugent, 2001] ), and rightly so. However, anthropologists tend to focus primarily on their own moral dilemmas rather than those of the people they encounter in the field, or at least they categorically separate the two issues. Ironically, this may create the impression that they have customs while we have morals (or at least moral dilemmas). However, one would expect that an anthropological theory of ethics may eventually also inform questions of ethics in anthropological practice. While we got used to emphasizing that professional ethics needs to influence the ways in which we customarily do research, we have not really gone a long way in understanding how morality emerges as we (all of us) practice our customs (or break with them). In this article I point out that the anthropological study of ethics, ethical systems, ethical behaviour, and morality more generally can benefit from a new theory of virtue that draws on anthropological approaches to art (as developed by A. Gell) and to skill (as developed by T. Ingold). Such a theory could shed new light on practices such as sharing, without falling back on pre-conceived ideas about the universality of human selfishness or generosity.
WHAT HAS BEEN THE CONTRIBUTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY SO FAR?
It is not sufficient to call for more anthropological attention to the subject of morality and leave it at that. In fact it has been argued that the main problem is not anthropological negligence towards moral matters but rather the tendency to treat morality as a dimension of all social action and social relations to the extent that it makes it harder to talk about these matters analytically and to identify a moral domain in its own right that can be investigated in its relation to the other dimensions of human conduct (Edel and Edel, 1968: 7; Parkin, 1985: 5) . Edel and Edel themselves struggled with the question of how to delimit a moral domain for anthropological investigation. They pointed out that there are few, if any, specialized institutions that would make up a moral 'department' in 'a given culture ' (1968: 8, 12) . Given the danger of forcing the criteria of one morality upon those of another, they settled for a rather wide and vaguely defined enquiry about the ways in which 'man weighs his duties, or seeks to build a good life ' (1968: 16) . This would cover both deontological ethics (of duty) and eudemonic ethics (of happiness). Their emphasis was on eliciting 'terms and concepts', 'moral discourse', i.e. 'what people say when pressed about their judgments ' (1968: 16) . The prime anthropological task in this conception is to provide a systematic account of different 'ethical systems', especially where the actors themselves do not readily provide systems of rules, ideas and regulations that easily compare to what is considered to be 'ethics' in the philosophical discourse. In a similar vein Overing (1985) in her introduction to a collected volume of case studies discussing different rationalities conceives of these differences as different moralities, emphasizing that ontological statements in other cultural contexts often (or always?) have a moral bearing. However, this invites the same critique as previously put forward against Durkheimian social analysis as one that tends to conflate the social with the moral (Parkin, 1985: 5) . As Howell (1997: 7) has pointed out, this is in fact an unfair, if common, misrepresentation of Durkheim who has written at great length about social facts such as inheritance, which he found to be deeply immoral while clearly socially central (1979: 213) . But the underlying problem remains. When Durkheim wrote 'if all social customs are not moral, all moral behavior is customary behavior ' (1973: 28) , he was primarily targeting a Kantian rationalistic approach which conceives of morality as being based on given categories quite unimpressed by social forms (see Turner, 1979: xxvi) . This social realist response to Kant has remained a central point in anthropological analyses of morality which has emphasized that moral reasoning and behaviour is not deductive, not proceeding from abstract principles, but is closely related to concrete situations, conflicts and dilemmas. At the same time Durkheim held that moral rules had a life of their own as regularities in customary behaviour (1973: 26-7) . They were there to assist humans since they provided sufficient constraints for goal-directed behaviour to take place. 2 He added that moral behaviour is unlike utilitarian behaviour in which we abide by rules not necessarily out of respect for authority but because of benefits 'intrinsic to the nature of the act and to its outcomes, possible or probable' (Durkheim, 1973: 30) . In this article I argue that there are also moral acts -virtues -that realize intrinsic goods. I want to show that a strong reaction against a rationalistic approach, by Durkheim and many anthropologists since, tends to conflate two aspects that are usefully kept separate. One is that of moral realism (of moral acts being intrinsically linked to human goods) and one is that of a moral consequentialism (of morality being conceptualized in terms of specific beneficial outcomes). Durkheim seems to reject both, although he clearly focuses on nonconsequentialism, since utilitarianism is one of his main targets. I suggest a theory of virtue that is non-consequentialist but at the same time moral realist in orientation. It is non-consequentialist in that it accounts for the moral dimension of practices such as 'sharing' and 'reciprocal exchange' without relying on problematic presumptions about proximate or ultimate consequences. It is realist insofar as its starting point is not a set of rationalist categories but social practices which entail reference to basic human goods such as sustenance and mutual engagement.
WHAT ARE THE CURRENT CHALLENGES TO A THEORY OF MORALITY AND ETHICS?
The post-socialist or, more precisely, post-Cold War period has brought the competition between East and West to an end that was not only a clash of economic and political systems but also between systems of moral values. Even after the political and economic collapse of the state socialist systems, many people living in the former socialist states (and sympathizers from outside) still maintain the notion of an ethical superiority of the socialist social system (see Hann, 2001 ). In Germany, in particular, the notion of a distinct socialist morality seems to be the core of a distinct East German versus a West Germany identity (Wieschiolek, 1999: 220) . The border between the two systems may have vanished as a military and political entity but it is 'reconstructed mentally'. After 1990 East Germans showed a negative assessment of the western system and their western compatriots based on a perceived moral inferiority, lacking the right attitude towards work but also lacking 'human qualities like modesty, solidarity, and helpfulness' (Wieschiolek, 1999: 220) . At the same time East Germans also wanted to succeed under the new conditions which created an apparently irresolvable dilemma for them in that 'if one wanted to be successful, one had to act in a way that was morally rejected; but if one wanted to behave according to one's moral standards, there was no chance of having success' (Wieschiolek, 1999: 221) . A particular crystallization point for these moral issues are conflicts between East and West Germans concerning the re-constitution of property (especially private housing).
However, there is something more fundamental at stake than the end of a clash of two value systems, between the capitalist value of options (to be able to choose) and the socialist value of security (to be able to secure access). The two political systems also came to stand for two fundamental moral principles, namely that of eudemony (the good society) and that of autonomy (the free individual) or, to put it differently, on the one hand the principle based on the pursuit of a happy and good society (the eudemonistic society) and on the other hand a principle based on the exercise of a free will (the autonomous being). Both ethical foci are of course much older than the Cold War. Aristotle and other Greek philosophers were mainly concerned about the morally good life and the virtuous path one would need to follow in order to lead such a good life. Today some moral philosophers use the label 'eudemonistic' as a substitute for the label 'socialist', even though it carries 'connotations of centralized, often dictatorial, state planning' (Lawson, 2001: 50) . The other principle, ethical concern about the autonomy of individual choice, has presented itself not only as a complement but also as an alternative way of thinking about morality, and it became dominant with Kant. Both principles have been drawn upon selectively by the two main political ideologies of the Cold War. Socialist ideology privileged the notion of a good socialist society, which made considerable requirements on citizens fulfilling their duties. This emerges when comparing the books that young Germans in the GDR received for their Jugendweihe, their socialist initiation, over the decades. The socialist writings of this genre always derive the guidelines for individual behaviour from what was envisaged to be the good society. This was made very explicit in these books, which quote exemplary young people who have recognized what they should be doing, reportedly saying things like 'after the international youth festival I understood that the socialist person is nothing else but the truly virtuous person'. The ideology of capitalist society, by contrast, propagated freedom of choice, which implicitly or explicitly also made a statement about the recommended way of pursuing and achieving happiness. Young people in the Federal Republic of Germany were provided with large numbers of booklets and self-assessment sheets for identifying their interests and capacities and the right professional career that would go with it. They were, to use Bourdieu's terms, lured into the illusion of free choice of a career and a profession and the pursuit of degrees, although sociological data shows that not only are professional careers not arbitrarily distributed but that the personal preferences, too, are constituted in a field of social power relations in which there is an inflation of degrees (see Bourdieu, 1979) . Thus, in terms of socializing its young people, the East propagated a eudemonic, and the West an autonomous ethical principle. 3 Analytically, particularly in any Cold War setting, we want to be able to deal both with the ways in which people strive for happiness and a good society and the ways in which they make decisions in the pursuit of individual goals. The great opportunity of anthropology in the post-socialist or post-Cold War period, therefore, is that it can bring these two strands together again -untethered by the old ideological opposition. The great theoretical challenge that remains is that the post Cold War setting seems to reconfirm a trade-off between ethics and everyday behaviour, between the recognized economic 'genius of the West' (Carrier and Miller, 1999: 26) and its ethical faults, between public virtue and private vice. The established view has it that action oriented towards individual human goals tends to be diluting or even defiling morals. Conversely, morals are said to be all very well as abstract demands or ideals but irrelevant or even counterproductive in the face of real human needs and goals. The main difficulty in arriving at a 'world ethos' (see Küng, 1997) then would no longer be that of divisions in the world at large -between East and West -but that of an assumed division bifurcating human action into abstract morals and concrete goals. The task of an anthropological approach in this context is therefore not so much one of translating between ethical systems but that of anchoring our understanding of virtue, or ethos more generally, in an ethnography of customary practices. We need to underline that ethos (and the same holds for the notion of culture) in the anthropological sense relates above all to everyday customs and to practical needs, and not to aloof concepts of right or wrong and good or bad. A notion of world ethos and a comparative perspective on ethics has to take into account that ethical concepts need to be grounded in practices and institutions and that they are in turn formed by these very practices and institutions (see Hauschild, 1999) . In this article, I aim to outline a theory of virtue that can provide some first steps in this direction. While the dominant anthropological approach to the moral dimension has for the most part consisted of attempts to (re-)construct and compare different ethics, i.e. elaborate systems of values (see Geertz, 2000) , or at least different moralities, that is, more or less coherent sets of rules and values that are systematized by ethical systems (see Howell, 1997) , I suggest that some headway can be made with an anthropological theory of virtue. Such an anthropology of virtuous practice would complement the anthropology of ethics and the anthropology of morality in so far as it investigates the ways in which basic human goods that are internal to practices come to be realized. I will now spell out in more detail below how this anthropology of virtue is envisaged.
HOW CAN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ART AND SKILL HELP US TO DEVELOP AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF VIRTUE?
There are a good number of recent contributions in philosophy and economics that aim to develop approaches based on a theory of virtue (e.g. MacIntyre, 1981; Shionaya and Yagi, 2001 ). I am proposing that for the sake of developing a genuine anthropological theory of virtue, which could handle the anthropological case material, it is more promising to take a lead from anthropological theorizing in a different field and apply it to the subject matter in question. Therefore, my starting point is Alfred Gell's theory of art as developed in his posthumous Art and Agency (Gell, 1998) and Tim Ingold's work on skill as developed recently in his The Perception of the Environment (Ingold, 2001) .
As with the study of 'primitive art' it could be -and it has been -argued that anthropology simply deals with those moral systems (for art works read: aesthetic systems) that lie outside the scope of those religions, ideologies, legal and cultural systems that dominate 'the West' and by now also 'the rest'. Given that anthropologists, for obvious reasons, are reluctant to universalize a specific theory of ethics that has developed in the West and to simply apply it elsewhere, it seems that the majority of anthropologists have settled for a relativistic stance. The role of theory in such a relativistic anthropology seems to be limited to establishing the characteristics of the morality inherent in each culture or society. While it is certainly important to create awareness about the fact that other cultural systems may be governed by other moral rules and that these rules need to be recognized, I argue that this by itself does not constitute an anthropological theory of virtue. My objections are similar to Gell's objection with regard to the elucidation of non-western aesthetic systems. I suggest that it is theoretically productive to focus on social agency and social relations instead of focusing on cultural rules, thus to aim for a theory of virtuous agency instead of a theory of ethics. If we replace 'art' with 'ethics', 'aesthetic' with 'moral', and 'art objects' with 'virtuous acts' in the argument, the following picture emerges. We should not be satisfied with an anthropological theory of virtue that confirms the incompatibility of different moral systems just as we are not satisfied with establishing that there are incompatible aesthetic worlds. We should not be content with a perspective that considers morality to be an individual process of consciousness, of enacting ethical principles, just as we are not content to consider art to be only a matter of individual creativity, enacting aesthetical principles. It is not sufficient to see that ethics are strongly influenced by necessity and power politics just as it is not sufficient to see that art is strongly influenced by the art market. Finally, we need not fear that including art will aestheticize our analysis, or that including ethics will moralize our theoretical concepts in a way that would make them useless. We will, however, need to shift from aesthetics to the use of art objects and from moral systems to virtuous action.
Just as we live in a world that is already aesthetisized, surrounded by objects that have been designed, we also live in a world that is already moralized and shaped by actions that relate to moral goods and objectives. However, in a strict anthropological sense we are not simply interested in different aesthetic or moral principles but in the ways in which human actors commit themselves to moral goods in their virtuous acts, or for that matter how they create objects of art, receive them and use them in their social relationships. Just as not all art objects are beautiful in the sense of a certain aesthetic -some masks are there to create fear -not all virtues necessarily have 'good' consequences in the sense of a certain moral system. To be hardworking or industrious, for instance, can be bad for the environment (in heavy industry), for peace (in a factory for land mines) or for the state budget (in the case of moonlighting). Both producing masks and being industrious are practices that cannot be deducted from or reduced to one aesthetic or one moral standard.
In his pursuit to highlight the human agency aspect of art, Gell emphasizes the art object that -externalized from its creator -can become an agent by itself. Paradoxically this emphasis leads away from artistic agency that may not involve the making of objects but 'pure' doing, for instance installation art. Recent attempts to bring back together art and technology (see Ingold, 2001 ) not only dissolve the categorical distinction between artworks and artefacts but also between making and doing as both may be considered in terms of skilled practice. On the background of the current anthropology of skills: the difference of skill being primarily a matter of making and virtue being primarily a matter of doing becomes a matter of degree or at least not a distinction that should lead us to overlook the fundamental similarities between the two. 4 As Ingold points out, skill is not only involved in the making of objects (Ingold, 2001: 290) .
One of the key points in Ingold's new anthropology of skill is that it no longer reduces skilled making to technical execution and no longer categorically separates design from construction (2001: 289) . A parallel point can be made with regard to the new anthropology of virtue that is envisaged here which no longer reduces virtuous practice to ruleabiding moral behaviour, the application of ethical rules, and no longer categorically separates the setting of moral values from the active pursuit of them. The constitution of a human good, like the form of an artefact, may be seen not in pre-existing designs but is internal to a virtuous practice and as generated by 'the pattern of regular movement' (Ingold, 2001: 291) . It follows that the importance of formal instruction has been overemphasized in both cases. The knowledge about how to do things (technically) -such as doing knots -is typically not handed on as a programme, as 'a package of rules and representations, independently and in advance of their practical application' (Ingold, 2001: 358) . Similarly, the knowledge about how to do things (morally/virtuously) -such as resolving the knots of entangled interests and dilemmas -may be handed on not as part of a moral package but in the process of responding to basic goods and of making moral decisions entailed in the pursuit of these basic human goods. Practitioners can become skilled producers as well as virtuous agents without having privileged access to the professional or moral codes, simply by perfecting their own movements. In this context it is important to point out that basic human goods, like the nature of all things, are not deduced from an essentialist concept of human life and nature but rather 'revealed only "after-the-fact" . . . in the light of subsequent experiences' (Ingold, 2001: 97) . In other words if a basic good is that which fosters the flourishing of life, and if life is not something given but something that anyone strives to realize, the basic goods are not given a priori but received prospectively as something that people strive to achieve. 5 It also follows that the definition of basic goods is cumulative and contingent on a sustained striving for life as a good. The process whereby social actors achieve a degree of virtuousness, of successfully responding to basic goods, is one of becoming experienced and proficient in handling abductions, rather than inductive or deductive logic (see Gell, 1998: 14; Widlok, 2002) . Although this reverses the established evaluation of practitioners as inferior followers of those who formulate representations about practices, it ultimately suggests a more diffuse or distributed notion of where the characteristic properties of a skill or virtue lie. In both cases, skill and virtue may no longer be limited to mean a property of isolated individuals but a property 'of the total field of relations in which they are situated' (Ingold, 2001: 98) .
One implication is that in their re-formulated versions these conceptions of skill and virtue provide a less problematic account about the emergence of skills and virtues than those that were previously possible. The established anthropology of technology and art that insisted on the privileged status of instruction and design also had to insist on a clear boundary between a state of nature governed by evolution and a state of culture governed by history. By contrast the new anthropology of skill allows us to see the continuity between skilful making of a bird's nest and the skilful making of string bags and other things (see Ingold, 2001 ). In a similar vein I would argue that the established anthropology of morality that insists on the privileged status of ethical rules has to insist on a sharp boundary between nature and culture, say the sharing among animals and the sharing among human beings. A new anthropology of virtue would still be able to describe the differences between the two but would also allow us to see both as practices in pursuit of a basic good, namely the flourishing of life.
Given the parallels between art, skill and virtue outlined here, are we to conclude that skilled practice and moral or virtuous practice are just the same? Both relate to a notion of 'good' but each with a distinct temporal aspect to it. While skill (or art for that matter) relates to a notion of completion and achievement, virtuous practice strives for a good, possibly without ever achieving it fully. However, we no longer need to assume that there are two separate 'modes of behaviour' -one moral, one amoral -each demanding its own explanation, since the step from skilled practice to virtuous practice is smaller than it appeared to be. Virtuous practice can be distinguished from other skilled practice in that it strives to realize basic goods entailed in the practice. I distinguish goods from benefits, the latter being classified goods or, to put it differently, goods that have a proper name or determiner such as a possessive noun attached. 6 Virtues (just as artworks and skilled handicrafts) are intended to change the world simply through themselves, for their own sake. They are to be distinguished from ethical codes, aesthetical standards and mechanical procedures. Sharing is a virtue that is carried out for its own sake, to provide people with a share. In this sense then sharing is a primitive notion, not one that is derived from a code or that represents something else.
Another consequence of this approach is that the very definition of what constitutes human life, the flourishing of life more generally, is not given but only emerges as people act in their specific social contexts. The constitution and definition of human goods is an open process and evolves as any other skill and as human life itself evolves. As with other skills this evolution is tied to the human body and to that of other living things with which humans interact and does therefore not develop arbitrarily in all directions. Since it can potentially and theoretically develop in a number of very different directions, however, it is the role of an anthropological enquiry in this context to identify empirically which directions are being pursued and to document how much of the potential is being realized. The following empirical examples will illustrate these points by focusing on one direction in which the human good has been defined and pursued, namely that of sharing.
'SHARING' AS A PRIMITIVE NOTION
Earlier in this article I have hinted at the tendency in scholarly theory to avoid 'primitive' moral notions, positive or negative, that 'just plain folks' recognize when they see or experience them (see Robertson, 2001: 7-8) . The same strategy seems to apply when the notion of sharing is consumed into an overall scheme of reciprocity. Conceiving sharing as a special type of reciprocity, as Sahlins (1988) and many researchers since have done, corrupts the notion and robs it of all critical potential. Sahlins distinguished balanced reciprocity, such as barter, from two types of unbalanced reciprocity characterized as generalized reciprocity (altruistic sharing) and negative reciprocity (immoral theft). This forces him to subsume very different institutions under the broad category of generalized reciprocity: the potlatch of Northwest-Coast Indians, the Moka of Melanesian big men, the formal distributions among Australian Aborigines and informal sharing of food among 'Bushmen' (Sahlins, 1988: 246-60 ). More recently, sharing and exchange have been characterized as two completely distinct modes of transferring property objects each entailing a distinct morality (see Woodburn, 1998) . But the distinction between sharing and reciprocity was made on the basis of a consequentialist model of moral action and I think that this creates considerable problems that a theory of virtue could solve. Formally, sharing and reciprocity are distinguished as a one-way transfer (in the case of sharing) as opposed to a two-way transfer (in the case of exchange or reciprocity). Especially with increasing awareness about the distributedness and temporality of agency, it has been pointed out that although a transfer may at first appear to be one-way, it can in fact be a two-way exchange when the time frame is being altered or if the defining frame of how the agents are constituted is being altered (Hunt, 2000) . Over longer periods one-way transfers may be found to go both ways eventually. Similarly, when an individual is seen as part of a corporate actor across individual persons or even generations, transfers that appeared to be one-way may turn out to be exchanges. To solve the problem, it has been suggested that ultimately the emic perspective has to be the defining factor, that is, we need to ask whether agents expect or demand that there will be a transfer in return (Hunt, 2000) . This immediately creates the problem that some agents may and others may not have such an expectation. Moreover, a single agent may over time change his or her view and expectation at least partly in response to time passing, opportunities being left unused, other opportunities opening up, needs and wants changing over time and so on. Furthermore, given the limitations of anthropological field research, we as observers may never find out whether a particular transfer was (or is going to be) an act of sharing or an instance of reciprocal exchange. It is therefore not satisfactory to make our understanding of the moral dimension of these acts hinge on consequences which we can only very inadequately observe -if at all. It has been pointed out that sharing is not only unbalanced but a completely one-sided transfer and therefore not reciprocal at all. From the actors' perspective it is often emphasized that acts of sharing are not causally connected to any balancing transfers in the past or in the future. For an ethnographer, therefore, who takes temporal depth and an extended network seriously, it is near to impossible to establish the boundaries between one-sided and two-sided transfers. Instead of focusing on the question of balancing it seems more important, and more pragmatic, therefore, to focus on the fact that sharing is morally and logically an act for its own sake. Sharing food with neighbours, relatives or anyone who happens to be around at the time is done for the sake of shared enjoyment of whatever it is that is being shared. Sharing in this perspective is not primarily a sharing out between dyads of givers and receivers but a sharing in, extending the circle of people who can enjoy the benefits of the shared resource. Sahlins' categorization of types of transfers ultimately loses sight of the relational networks that are established through sharing. Sharing creates a shared base, triggering the emergence of social groups and shared identities. The act of sharing itself creates this sharing in, a group of people who share not only some resource but a moral base of mutual engagement more generally (see Gudeman, 2001 ). Sharing can be initiated both by the giver and by the receiver; demand sharing is a common and an accepted practice. Even more frequent among hunters and gatherers is sharing that does not involve any transfer from A to B but in which A and B help themselves to x or y. Alternatively, there is an indirect transfer whereby typically a child C is sent from one hearth to another, transferring Z. Every attempt is made to emphasize that sharing happens for the sake of sharing, of sustenance and of shared participation in life. Accumulation and exchange, by contrast, are always done for the sake of something else, in order to achieve something in the future or to even out (or surpass) something from the past. Hunter-gatherers, too, at times attempt to keep resources out of the realm of sharing, in order to use them for some other purpose later on, for instance in order to sell them at another place. If these attempts are successful and if interaction becomes dominated by accumulation and exchange, then the shared base is being lost. Preventing the loss of the shared base and attempting to extend the base, to include others or to be included by others, counteracts these attempts. We need to take account of this interplay between the diverse possibilities of extending and restricting, of incorporation and exclusion. Preserving a 'primitive' notion of sharing that is not subsumed under correlations of distance and types of reciprocity puts social agency back into the picture. This is the notion of sharing, which can be explored further.
WHAT DOES AN APPLICATION OF VIRTUE THEORY TO QUESTIONS OF SHARING LOOK LIKE?
In recent years the view that ethnographic instances of sharing involve a moral notion of generosity has been challenged, in particular in hunter-gatherer studies. The argument is not that sharing in hunter-gatherer contexts has no moral implications but that it should not be presupposed that it is based on the ethics of generosity. One of the main arguments is that demand sharing is very common and that sharing has more to do with allowing others to access resources than with acts of giving. In a similar vein it has been emphasized that sharing is not a form of reciprocity because it does not lend itself to the creation of obligations for future transfers nor is it likely to even out over time. Consider the following example:
In ≠Giseb (an area of northern Namibia occupied by ≠Akhoe 'San') people collect the !no, also called 'Bushman oranges' (Strychnos cocculoides), and put them in the sand (about 50 cm deep) to ripen. In these ete (sand storage holes) they are considered private property. When I travelled with Tirob, who has the greatest number of ete at ≠Giseb, we passed one of Abakub's ete which we did not touch but went on to Tirob's esa (ete sing.) which was well disguised and secured with a thorny branch. It contained 40 fruit, 6 of which were bad and had to be thrown away. Two were ripe and were eaten on the spot; the others were put back again. This esa was the closest to the camp (40 minutes walk); another one not far from there was an old springhare hole which was used for that purpose. Tirob then went on to another esa that was further away. He returned an hour later and had emptied it completely (25 fruit) which were shared with his mother, Abakub and his parents, //Ubeb and Kereb, /Hauseb and his family, and with Tomab, but not with Eliab and !Naredoeb who were camping some distance away. (For more details see Widlok, 1999.) The Hai//om of Namibia, and the !Kung, their better-known neighbours, do have personal rights in property. Harvesting and storing the sweet !no fruit provides an example. The fruit is typically harvested by individuals who put them into their underground stores, which are considered to be private property. They ripen in the warm sand where they are protected from animals but also from fellow human beings who would pick them one after the other if they were left hanging on the tree. 7 What we have here is a clear case of exclusive property rights. But strictly speaking it only constitutes half the story. Tirob, the young man who had buried all these !no in the sand, also dug them out eventually and took them back to the camp. In the camp the practices of granting access, which form part of the Hai//om repertoire, came into play. The whole excursion was prompted by conversations in camp -a moderate form of demand sharing -about !no, how well they tasted and how unfortunate it was that there were so few of them. Tirob was able to exploit his ownership rights in so far as others left his underground storage alone; he was able to consume some !no on the spot before taking them to the camp. However, as soon as he entered the camp, everybody present had access. Spatial proximity was the only criterion delimiting the group of people who could make a claim; no reference to existing obligations or to genealogical ties was made. As Tirob returned to the camp everyone who was within sight and who happened to be there -but not those who were out of sight and whose huts were at some distance -got a share. This is therefore not an act of unsolicited giving and it would seem misleading if we were to frame this in terms of a doctrine of altruistic generosity. At the same time Tirob was quite clear that few in the camp have underground stores and that it was very unlikely that there would be an equivalent 'return gift' from everyone who received !no from him and it seems, therefore, also misleading to frame his action in terms of an ultimately egoistic strategy of investing or of creating specific obligations. Nevertheless, Tirob certainly had a choice, of not going to the storage at this stage, of bringing fewer !no into camp, of eating more !no on the spot, of not having any underground stores to begin with. My argument is that he was pursuing the basic good of consuming !no, which is not a named good in the sense that it was his good but rather a basic good for anyone present, including myself as a relative stranger. In this context the frequently reported practice of demand sharing, of requesting something, as the normal way in which sharing is initiated becomes more understandable, too. Those who do not ask, appear not to need anything. Those who do demand, appeal to a shared basic good, that of consuming or of using the item in question, and not to a named good of an individual or of a designated group. They demand the de-classification of goods. Wild fruits like the !no clearly have the potential to be accumulated and to be used for the sake of something else, i.e. to be exchanged or to be sold. There is no need to eat them straightaway (since they can be stored) but there is also no need to exchange, barter or sell them for other goods (since they can be shared or simply consumed). Rather, storage and transfers are ways of dealing with the peculiar growth pattern of this fruit. Sharing in these instances need not involve a generous person who gives, nor a transfer at all, but it entails allowing others access, and to do this for its own sake, i.e. for the sake of jointly enjoying these resources. Sharing in this sense changes the world in two ways: it alters the distribution of goods/resources (sharing out) and it alters the composition of the group of people enjoying the resource (sharing in). It is not done by default but it is constituted by turnout. In other words, sharing alters the constitution of one's base (see Gudeman, 2001) . Through sharing the base may be extended. Through limitations on sharing, by contrast, the base may be restricted and accumulation for the purpose of exchanges is facilitated. Accumulation allows the use of resources not for their own sake but for the sake of something else, e.g. to create obligations. Whatever the intrinsic good of a resource may be (e.g. that it provides food or transport), accumulation provides room for goals that go beyond these goods. Introducing restrictions on sharing and allowing for accumulation may be an accepted practice that follows cultural conventions but it is not a virtue, i.e. not an action for the sake of itself.
To put it differently, any restriction imposed on sharing may be justified for the sake of an acknowledged good cause or morally accepted goal. Hai//om have the notion of soxa (taboo) that restricts the sharing of certain foodstuffs, above all certain parts of game and the first fruits of a season (see Widlok, 1999) . These restrictions are moral in the sense of being conventionally accepted or even recommended practice. Keeping the taboo is said to maintain the well-being of everyone concerned. Some of these moral conventions may be widely spread but they cannot be universal since there is no intrinsic link between the practice and the good. The same practice may be employed for the sake of a number of different aims. Virtues, by contrast, have this intrinsic link. Sharing entails the good of joint use of a resource and that of creating a base of users. It is this intrinsic link that gives sharing (and other virtues) their particular forcefulness. There is wide agreement amongst field researchers who have reported on the strength of sharing as an obligation (see contributions in Ingold et al., 1988; Wenzel et al., 2000) . At the same time, most of these cases -at least in hunter-gatherer studies -are cases in which sanctioning powers are not highly institutionalized so that the puzzle was raised as to how an obligation not to create obligations could work (Brunton, 1989; see Widlok, 1999: 12) . I suggest that in the absence of such sanctioning powers it is the intrinsic link between good and practice which provides force to sharing and similar virtues. Moreover, 'primitive notions' like sharing continue to have a critical potential in advanced political and scholarly discourses (see Robertson, 2001) . It is a common, maybe the most common, feature of political discourses in state societies that governments declare strategies which are intrinsically not good (because they restrict citizens' freedoms or their use of resources) for the sake of what is considered to be an ultimate good (e.g. the funding of national monuments or the maintenance of the state more generally). Conversely practices with intrinsic goods (e.g. not going to war) are redefined in terms of their negative effects with regard to long-term goals (e.g. prosperity). Public opposition against such measures remains strong and continues to resurface because of the strength of intrinsic links between a practice and a good. For the same reason what is known as 'sharing values' often continues to strongly influence communities which have given up hunting and gathering as their basic strategy for making a livelihood some considerable time ago (see McKnight, 2002: 73) .
What complicates matters in all these situations is that many transfers (or any other practices for that matter) are usually informed by a number of goods and goals, some explicitly formulated, some intrinsic and others eclipsed. In fact, one could argue that what defines a case as a case of sharing is that no explicit goal is being set, but that the process seems to be triggered by the presence of neighbours in need. I therefore suggest that instead of defining sharing in terms of a non-continued sequence of one-way transfers it should be defined in terms of a particular sequence of terms (especially the terms 'goal' and 'good'), not transfers, involved. I am not arguing that in the processes described there are no goals being set by the social agents involved but only that these acts of goal setting are being eclipsed. With reference to my Namibian case Tirob obviously has set himself a goal, namely to secure !no for consumption. This leads him to the practice of digging holes in which the !no fruit is left to ripen. Goal and practice are, however, eclipsed in another practice which is a result of having underground stores, namely the benefit of having a source of !no available while staying at a single place (or returning to it at short intervals) for the period it takes for the fruit to ripen, the !no season. Being able to stay with relatives is a good -which in other contexts may be compromised by other goods such as that of individual autonomy or of living without conflicts -but it entails the practice of sharing, of having others participate in the use of one's underground stores. There is a goal involved in this sequence but it is eclipsed in the good of not having to move away, not having to split from family and friends. I believe that a similar argument could be made with regard to the ways in which Australian Aborigines today allow others to use their vehicles (see Widlok, 2002) .
Typically, the process of sharing is triggered by the beneficiaries in need who approach those who have and give. We may go one step further by extending this understanding of the moral dimension of behaviour reflexively into the domain of the ethics of anthropological research itself, and -increasingly important -the ethics of regulating access for anthropological research. In contrast to goals being 'eclipsed' as in the cases mentioned here, in the case of research politics, for instance in Aboriginal Australia, goals are now explicitly set by indigenous organizations but also by non-Aboriginal consultants employed by Aboriginal institutions. Anthropological researchers coming from outside are often suspected of purposefully leaving out their own goals, such as improving their own situation by conducting successful research, and instead explicitly invoke a good, usually that of a joint humanity enjoying the fruits of intellectual and cultural exchange. Some of the resistance that researchers often experience in places like Australia is based on the fact that Aboriginal counterparts, or at least some of their gatekeepers, are suspicious of hidden ultimate goals, for instance that the researcher is being sent by some business-sponsored private university which would use the information gathered not for the shared benefit of Aborigines and researchers but for its own commercial interests.
But a more general argument can be made, namely that contradictions or incompatibilities between different sequences of terms may be used to explain the occurrence of cultural misunderstandings or of contrasting discourses about economic transfers. A case in point is conflict within Aboriginal society today (see Widlok, 2002) . Another example relates to the economic transfers between Hai//om 'San' or 'Bushmen' and the Owambo, their agropastoralist neighbours. While the Owambo, and following their testimony many European observers, insist that the Hai//om were giving copper and wild animal products as a tribute to the Owambo kings, the same transfer was considered an instance of reciprocal exchange by the Hai//om involved (see Widlok, 1999 Widlok, , 2000 . Owambo argue that they gave food to Hai//om as a benevolent response to the Hai//om who accepted the Owambo king by either providing him with the products of the forest or by leading him to the game, by granting him direct access to it. In other words the Owambo attribute the good of being part of their kingdom, of showing allegiance to the king, to their Hai//om counterparts and may not recognize the Hai//om goal of consuming agricultural products. The Hai//om involved may not entertain Owambo goods at all but may construct the transfer quite differently. What is considered to be 'paying tribute' by one party may be seen as an instance of reciprocal exchange by the other party involved. However, I would like to emphasize that this is not merely a matter of different perceptions of the same process because ultimately this feeds back into practices and may result in clashes between the parties involved.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have offered a new way of including the moral dimension of social practice into anthropological analysis. The objective was to go beyond a relativistic stance that simply juxtaposes different ethical systems or moralities and leaves it at that. The underlying strategy for achieving this objective was to focus on virtue and virtuous practice, rather than on elaborated ethical systems or on the moral contents of these systems. In contrast to consequentialist accounts which, for instance, distinguish sharing from exchange in terms of claimed or expected one-way and two-way transfers, that is, in terms of consequences over time, my account differentiates goods, goals, and benefits as different aspects relating to virtuous practice. Following this approach, sharing can be defined theoretically as a particular constellation of these aspects. It should be pointed out that this analytical tool is not meant to be used to distinguish moral from amoral behaviour. On the contrary, it can help to replace a facile dichotomy between 'truly indigenous' (following 'traditional' moral rules) and 'non-indigenous' (using 'modern' morally disembedded procedures) with a more sophisticated analysis of how moral goods are contained in practice (see Widlok, 2001) .
It is the recognized task of anthropology and its neighbouring social sciences to describe 'the human condition', to show the variety of ways in which humans live in their social relations. A major part, maybe the crucial part, of what the human condition 'is', is that humans constantly develop notions as to what 'ought to be' and that they strive for it. They assess what 'is' in the light of what they think 'ought to be', and they assess one another in these terms, too. When social science research includes the moral dimension it tends to look at the ways in which an 'ought', a codified moral scheme, becomes the dominant discourse that has impact on social relations or continues to inform practices under conditions of change as, for example, in postsocialist and post-colonialist settings. An anthropology of virtue, by contrast, primarily investigates how an 'ought' is developed from an 'is', that is with reference to basic goods entailed in practices. While philosophers continue to argue about the logical possibilities of developing moral positions, i.e. ought, from social conditions, i.e. is (see Lawson, 2001 and Black, 2000 for summaries) , it is important to note from an anthropological perspective that people around the world do it all the time. That is to say, people strive to bring future realities into being and they develop their ideas of what 'is to be' (a practical 'ought') from their situation (a particular 'is'). An anthropology of virtues, as it has been outlined in this article, would allow us to compare and analyse instances of practical reasoning of this sort, to thereby recapture an important aspect of the moral dimension of human action and of social relations for the social sciences, but at the same time also to prepare the ground for ethical reflections about ethnographic research. We should not presume that such an anthropological theory of virtue will necessarily have an immediate impact on moral philosophy. However, it can go beyond the delimitation of separate and relatively distinct moral universes. The task of incorporating social science data into the field of moral philosophy is a long-term enterprise and it still remains to be done. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that the results presented by an anthropology of virtue will be welcomed by philosophical approaches that consider ethics as an open-ended process which is not exhausted a priori but which is continually broadened by humans carrying out their activities, making their choices and reflecting upon them.
an immediate-return system implies the inability to postpone consumption or the inability to plan for the future. This is clearly not the case, and it was not implied in the concept of an 'immediate return system' (see Woodburn, 1982 
